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I. Importance of “Habitual Residence” in Hague Convention Cases
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction1 provides for the prompt return of children who have been
* Copyright, 2011, Jeff Atkinson.  Jeff Atkinson teaches at DePaul University College 
of Law, Chicago.  He also serves as a professor-reporter for the Illinois Judicial Conference,
responsible for training Illinois judges in Family Law.  Professor Atkinson is the author of four
books on Family Law, including MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE (2d ed. LexisNexis 2010). 
The author=s e-mail address is:  JAtkin747@aol.com.
1. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter CCAICA]; see also Hague
International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar.
26, 1986).  Drafting of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction was concluded at the Hague in the Netherlands on October 25, 1980.  See id.  The
United States Senate ratified the Convention in October 1986.  The text of the Convention and
related materials are available online.  See Full Text: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act= conventions.text&cid=24 (last
visited June 24, 2011).  The U.S. State Department=s website also contains material regarding
International Parental Child Abduction.  See International Parental Child Abduction,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV., http://travel.state.gov/abduction/abduction_580.html (last visited June 24,
647
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wrongfully taken from their state of habitual residence or wrongfully
retained outside their state of habitual residence.2  Thus, a key element of an
action under the Hague Convention is ascertainment of the child=s state
(country) of habitual residence. If a state from which a child is taken not
found to be the child=s habitual residence, the return remedy of the
Convention is not available.3 
Under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), the
burden of proof for proving the child=s state of habitual residence is
preponderance of the evidence.4 
The meaning of “habitual residence” also is important for another Family
Law Convention B the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children B
which determines which country has jurisdiction to determine a child=s
custody or protect a child=s property.5  The United States ratified the
convention in 2010.6
II. Lack of Fixed Definition of “Habitual Residence”
The Hague Abduction Convention does not define “habitual residence.” 
The term is commonly used in international conventions covering a variety
of subjects, and the drafters of the conventions deliberately avoided seeking
2011).  
2. See CCAICA, supra note 1, at art. 3 (“The removal or the retention of a child is to be
considered wrongful where B (a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an
institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and (b) at the time
of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would
have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.”); CCAICA, supra note 1, at art. 12
(“Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date
of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the
Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of
the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child
forthwith.”).
3. See Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2004).
4. See 42 U.S.C. '' 11603(e)(1) (2006) (“A petitioner in an action brought under
subsection (b) of this section shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence B (A) in the
case of an action for the return of a child, that the child has been wrongfully removed or
retained within the meaning of the Convention . . . .”); Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994-95
(6th Cir. 2007); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 434 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2006).
5. See Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children,
Oct. 19, 1996, 2204 U.N.T.S. 39130, available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/conventions/
txt34en.pdf.  
6. Press Release, U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Signature of the Child Protection Convention
(Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.state. gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149860.htm.
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to impose a precise, fixed definition.  A 1989 Hague Convention case from
the United Kingdom, In Re Bates,7 frequently cited in the United States,8
stated: “It is greatly to be hoped that the courts will resist the temptation to
develop detailed and restrictive rules as to habitual residence, which might
make it as technical a term of art as common law domicile. The facts and
circumstances of each case should continue to be assessed without resort to
presumptions or pre-suppositions.”9 
Courts in the United States also have noted that the Convention does not
provide a definition of “habitual residence.”10  The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals said the decision to not include a definition of “habitual residence”
in the Convention “has helped courts avoid formalistic determinations but
also has caused considerable confusion as to how courts should interpret
‘habitual residence.’”11
III. Need for “Settled Purpose;” General Description of “Habitual
Residence”
In In re Bates, the court described “habitual residence” as follows:
[T]here must be a degree of settled purpose. The purpose may be
one or there may be several. It may be specific or general. All
that the law requires is that there is a settled purpose. That is not
to say that the propositus intends to stay where he is indefinitely.
Indeed his purpose while settled may be for a limited period.
Education, business or profession, employment, health, family or
merely love of the place spring to mind as common reasons for a
choice of regular abode, and there may well be many others. All
that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has
7. No. CA 122.89, 1989 WL 1683783 (UK), High Court of Justice, Family Division
Court, Royal Court of Justice (1989).
8. See generally Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2001); Feder v. Evans-Feder,
63 F.3d 217, 222B24 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
9. In re Bates, 1989 WL 1683783, at *13 (quoting 1 DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 166 (Lawrence Collins et al. Eds., 11th ed. 1987)).
10. See, e.g.,  Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 103-04 (1st Cir. 2010); Gitter v.
Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2005); Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 897 (8th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir.
2001); see also Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Brief
Overview and Case Law Analysis, 28 FAM. L.Q. 9, 20 (1994) (“The Convention does not
provide a definition of habitual residence, but identifying the State of habitual residence is
critical.”).
11. Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004).
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a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as
settled.12
It is generally agreed a person can have only one habitual residence at a
time,13 although as the Ninth Circuit has noted, “The exception would be
the rare situation where someone consistently splits time more or less
evenly between two locations, so as to retain alternating habitual residences
in each.”14  Determination of habitual residence “is a fact-specific inquiry
that should be made on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, . . . a parent cannot
create a new habitual residence by wrongfully removing and sequestering a
child.”15  The issue of “settled intention” does not depend on express
declarations alone.16  “Settled intention” can be “manifest from one=s
actions; indeed, one=s actions may belie any declaration that no
abandonment was intended.”17
IV. Perspective of Child vs. Perspective of Parents
Courts in the United States differ regarding the degree to which habitual
residence should be determined from the perspective of the child versus the
perspective of the parents.  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Friedrich v. Friedrich held:  “To
determine the habitual residence, the court must focus on the child, not the
parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”18  The court in
Friedrich described the instant action as “a simple case.”19 The child was
born in Germany.20  The mother was a U.S. citizen, serving in the U.S.
Army in Germany.21  The father was a German citizen, employed on the
military base as a club manager and bartender.22  When their child was 19
months old, the parents separated, and the mother left Germany for the
United States with the child.23  Mrs. Friedrich departed Germany without
12. In re Bates, 1989 WL 1683783, at *13.
13. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075 n.17; Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
14. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075 n.17.
15. Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2001). 
16. See Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075.
17. Id.; see also Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In making this
determination [of habitual residence] the court should look, as always in determining intent, at
actions as well as declarations.”). 
18. 983 F.2d at 1401.  
19. See id. at 1402.
20. See id. 
21. See id. at 1398
22. See id. 
23. See id. at 1399.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/3
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Mr. Friedrich=s consent or knowledge.24  Mr. Friedrich filed a Hague
Convention action in the U.S. seeking return the child.25  The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the child was a habitual resident of Germany at
the time of his removal.26  “[The child] had resided exclusively in Germany.
Any future plans that Mrs. Friedrich had for [the child] to reside in the
United States are irrelevant to our inquiry.”27  Thus, the custody dispute
regarding the child should be heard in Germany B the child=s state of
habitual residence B unless a defense to return of the child can be proved.28 
The case was remanded to the trial court.29 
Another case in which the Sixth Circuit focused on the perspective of the
children rather than the parents is Robert v. Tesson.30  Robert involved twin
six-year-old boys who had moved multiple times with their parents between
the United States and France, although the boys had spent more time in the
United States than in France.31  In the one-year period before litigation
commenced, the children spent ten months in the U.S., and three weeks in 
France before the mother left again to the U.S. with the children, leaving
the father a note about mother=s and children=s departure.32  During the ten-
month stay in the U.S., the boys attended kindergarten in the Denver area,
vacationed with the mother=s family in Yellowstone National Park, and
visited their maternal grandmother in Baton Rouge.33  The Sixth Circuit
cited with approval the magistrate judge=s finding that “the children became
‘more and more socialized in the United States.’”34 The court said: “a
child=s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically
present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a
degree of settled purpose from the child=s perspective.”35  The court also
said: “The twins= final trip to France lasted only three short weeks. In that
time, they had few experiences that would have acclimatized them to their
new surroundings, or which would indicate a settled purpose to remain in
France.”36
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. at 1402.
27. See id. at 1401. 
28. See id. at 1403.
29. Id.
30. 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007).  
31. See id. at 984-86.
32. See id. at 987, 997.
33. See id. at 986.
34. Id. at 996.
35. Id. at 998 (quoting Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995)).
36. Id. 
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Other courts have placed more emphasis on the intentions of the parents
than on than the perspectives of the child.  In a Second Circuit case, Gitter
v. Gitter,37 the court held:  
[I]n determining a child=s habitual residence, a court should
apply the following standard: First, the court should inquire into
the shared intent of those entitled to fix the child=s residence
(usually the parents) at the latest time that their intent was
shared. In making this determination the court should look, as
always in determining intent, at actions as well as declarations.
Normally the shared intent of the parents should control the
habitual residence of the child. Second, the court should inquire
whether the evidence unequivocally points to the conclusion that
the child has acclimatized to the new location and thus has
acquired a new habitual residence, notwithstanding any conflict
with the parents= latest shared intent.38
In Gitter, the father wanted to move from the United States to Israel.39 
The mother was reluctant to do so, but agreed to move to Israel on a trial
basis when the child was three months old.40  After eleven months in Israel,
the mother returned to the United States with the child, and the mother
expressed a desire to remain in the United States.441  The father, with the aid
of a family friend “eventually convinced [the mother] to return to Israel by
promising her that if she were still unhappy in six months, she could return
to the United States.”42  Approximately five months later, the mother and
child traveled to the United States, purportedly on vacation, and did not
37. 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005).  
38. Id. at 134.  Other circuit courts have focused on parental intent.  See Maxwell v.
Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2009); Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1252-54 (11th
Cir. 2004)(per curiam); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 103-04 (1st Cir. 2010) (“the majority of federal circuits
. . . have adopted an approach that begins with the parents' shared intent or settled purpose
regarding their child=s residence”).  But cf. Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir.
1995) (“we believe that a child=s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree
of settled purpose’ from the child=s perspective.  We further believe that a determination of
whether any particular place satisfies this standard must focus on the child and consists of an
analysis of the child=s circumstances in that place and the parents= present, shared intentions
regarding their child=s presence there.”)
39. See Gitter, 396 F.3d at 128.
40. See id. 
41. See id. at 128-29.
42. Id. at 129.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/3
2011] THE MEANING OF “HABITUAL RESIDENCE” 653
return to Israel.43  The father filed an action in New York federal court
seeking return of the child under the Hague Convention.44 
In explaining why the court should give primary focus to the intent of the
parents, the court said:  “‘[c]hildren . . . normally lack the material and
psychological wherewithal to decide where they will reside.’ Thus, it is
more useful to focus on the intent of the child=s parents or others who may
fix the child=s residence. . . . Informed by these holdings, we will presume
that a child=s habitual residence is consistent with the intentions of those
entitled to fix the child's residence at the time those intentions were
mutually shared.”45
The Second Circuit seemed to agree with the trial court=s finding “that
there was no ‘settled mutual intent to make Israel [the child=s] permanent
home.’”46  The case was nonetheless remanded for application of the proper
legal standard, including examination of “the evidence to determine if it
unequivocally points to the child having acclimatized and thus acquired
Israel as his habitual residence.”47
Similarly, in Ruiz v. Tenorio, the 11th Circuit focused more on the intent
of the parents than the perspective of the children.48  In Ruiz, the father was
a citizen of Mexico; the mother was a citizen of the U.S.; and the children
were approximately ages five and ten when the litigation began.49 After
having spent seven years in United States, the family moved to Mexico for
what the father and mother agreed was “a trial period and that if it did not
work out, the family would move back.”50  The family spent more than two
years and ten months in Mexico, and the children were enrolled in school
there.51  The mother took the children to the U.S. and told the father they
would not be returning.52  The father convinced the mother to return to
Mexico and give the marriage another try.53  She did so, but the
reconciliation attempt lasted only a few months, and the mother then left for
43. See id. 
44. See id.
45. Id. at 132-33 (quoting Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1061, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)) (alteration
in original) (footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 135 (quoting Gitter v. Gitter, No. 03-CV-3374, 2003 WL 22775375, at *4 (E.D.
N.Y. Nov. 20, 2003). 
47. Id. at 135-36.  
48. See 392 F.3d 1247, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
49. See id. at 1249-50.
50. Id. at 1249.
51. See id. at 1249-50, 1255.
52. See id. at 1250.
53. See id. 
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the U.S. with the children without telling the father.54  The father filed a
wrongful removal action under the Hague Convention in the U.S.55  The
District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the U.S. B and not
Mexico B was the children=s state of habitual residence.56  Although the
court appeals “acknowledge[d] that this is a relatively close case,”57 the
court said “there was never a settled mutual intention on the part of the
parents” to abandon the U.S. as the state of habitual residence and establish
a new state of habitual residence in Mexico.58
Had Ruiz been decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the result
would have been different.  In criticizing the decision in Ruiz, the Sixth
Circuit said: “A child who lives in Mexico, attends Mexican school, and
makes Mexican friends for three years builds an attachment to Mexico that
would lead any child to call that country ‘home.’”59 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
would have found that Mexico was the state of habitual residence of the
Ruiz children.
V. Factors Considered When Determining “Habitual Residence”
Courts consider a variety of factors when determining a child=s habitual
residence. The factors can be divided into two broad categories: factors
regarding intent and factors regarding acclimatization of the child to the
country of residence.60  A single factor usually is not determinative, and
courts often need to weigh conflicting factors. This section will list the
factors that have been considered by courts and provide brief commentary
about each.
A. Factors Related to Parental Intent 
! Parental employment B The employment of one or both parents in a
country to which the parents recently moved can be evidence of
establishing a new habitual residence.  Conversely, leaving one=s




56. See id. 
57. Id. at 1256.
58. Id.
59. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 991 (6th Cir. 2007). 
60. A list containing some of these factors was provided in Maxwell v. Maxwell.  See 588
F.3d 245, 252-54 (4th Cir. 2009). 
61. See, e.g., Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 218-19, 224 (3d Cir. 1995) (husband
terminated from job at U.S. bank and accepted job at Australian bank; wife, although she had
misgivings about marriage, moved to Australia and accepted a role in an upcoming performance
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/3
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! Purchase of home B Purchase of a home also is evidence of
establishing habitual residence.62   Purchase of a home is more likely to be a
basis for such a finding than short-term stays with relatives or in a rental
apartment.63
! Moving of belongings B The movement of family belonging can
establish intent to establish a new habitual residence.64  However, shipping
some belongings while keeping other belongings in the state from which
one moved can be evidence of not intending to change habitual residence.65
! Location of bank accounts B A parent=s decision to maintain bank
accounts in a country where the parent had lived, despite spending time in a
new country, is evidence of the parent=s tie to the original country.66 
! Obtaining driver=s license and professional licenses B Obtaining a
driver=s license or professional license in a new country (or attempting to
obtain such licenses) is evidence of intent establish a new habitual
residence.67 
! Marital instability B If the family is moving at a time of marital
instability, that can be viewed as supporting evidence that at least one of the
parents did not intend to live at the new location indefinitely, and thus there
was not intent to establish a new habitual residence.68  This is particularly
true if the parties agreed the move was for a “trial period.”69 
of an opera company).
62. See, e.g., Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (couple purchased and renovated home in Australia).
63. See e.g., Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617, 627 (9th Cir. 2007) (not finding
Greece to be the habitual residence when, among other factors, the family initially stayed with
relatives and then in a rental apartment).
64. See, e.g., Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 898 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The [trial] court
should have determined the degree of settled purpose from the children=s perspective, including
the family=s change in geography along with their personal possessions and pets . . . .”); Silvestri
v. Oliva, 403 F. Supp. 2d 378, 381, 385-86 (D. N.J. 2005) (shipping furniture including
children=s beds and other belongings from Argentina to U.S. was evidence of U.S. becoming
habitual residence). 
65. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 2009).
66. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (the
mother=s maintaining bank accounts and credit cards in the U.S. was cited as evidence that “the
family was in limbo during its stay in Mexico” and thus supported a finding that the U.S.
remained the habitual residence of the children).
67. See Silvestri, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (father=s “repeated efforts to obtain a [driver=s]
license, as well as the other facts surrounding his move to the United States, belie [his] assertion
that he immediately objected to and opposed establishing roots in the United States”).  In Ruiz
v. Tenorio, midway during the family=s period living in Mexico, the mother traveled to Florida
and obtained a nursing license, which was viewed as evidence that she did not intend Mexico
to become the habitual residence of herself or the children.  See 392 F.3d at 1250, 1254.  
68. See Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255.
69. See, e.g., id. at 1249, 1254; see also Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 128-29, 135 (2d Cir.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
656 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:647
! Citizenship; immigration status; type of visa B If a parent and child
come to a country on a tourist visa and do not seek more permanent
residency status, that can lead to a finding that habitual residence in the
prior country from which the parent and child came was not abandoned.70 
A court has observed, however, “While an unlawful or precarious
immigration status does not preclude one from becoming a habitual resident
under the Convention, it prevents one from doing so rapidly.”71
B. Factors Related to Acclimatization of the Child
Discussing acclimatization, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
“[T]he inquiry is, more generally, whether the children=s lives have become
firmly rooted in their new surroundings. Simply put, would returning the
children to [the country from which they have been taken] be tantamount to
sending them home?”72  Factors considered by courts in determining
acclimatization include:  
! School enrollment B Enrollment in school can be a key factor in
showing that the child has acclimated to a new residence.73     
! Participation in social activities B A child=s socialization with children
at school or outside of school in a new environment increases the likelihood
the child will be found to have acclimated to the new environment.74 
Conversely, when the evidence shows the child has not adapted to a new
environment, the new environment will be less likely to be found to be the
child=s habitual residence.75 
2005). 
70. See, e.g., Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255 (finding there was not shared intent to abandon
residence in the United States when the mother “and the children went to Mexico on tourist
visas, and there is no evidence that either [the mother or father] sought to acquire permanent
legal status or Mexican citizenship for [the mother] and the children”); Mozes v. Mozes, 239
F.3d 1067, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting the habitual residence of the children may be Israel
rather than the United States when the mother “and the children left for the United States with
a temporary visa, casting considerable doubt on whether they would be allowed to remain here
indefinitely even if they wished to”).
71. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1082 n.45.
72. Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004).
73. See, e.g., Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing a four-year-
old=s attendance in preschool and enrollment in kindergarten for the following year during the
family=s nearly six-month stay in Australia as evidence that Australia had become the child=s
habitual  residence); Silvestri v. Oliva, 403 F. Supp. 2d 378, 386 (D. N.J. 2005) (citing
withdrawal of children from school in Argentina and enrollment in a U.S. school as evidence
of U.S. becoming the children=s habitual residence).
74. See Silvestri, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 382, 386-87 (the court found the “children have made
friends in school as well as friends they see after school” after they moved to the U.S.).
75. In Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, the court of appeals court found Greece not to be the
habitual residence when “the district court noted that the evidence showed that the couple=s son
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! Length of stay in the country B The longer a child (and family) stay in
a country, the more likely the child will be found to have acclimated the
country.  Since there is not a precise definition of “habitual residence”
under the Convention, the length of time is not fixed.  Children have been
found to have acclimated and, thus to have established a new country of
habitual residence, in as little as two and one-half months.76  However, in
one case, the children=s stay in a new country of more than two years and
ten months was found not to have established a new habitual residence.77
! Child’s age B An older child is more likely to have experiences that
would result in a finding of acclimatization, including ties to school and
socialization.78  Regarding very young children, the Ninth Circuit observed:
“if a child is born where the parents have their habitual residence, the child
normally should be regarded as a habitual resident of that country. . . . 
Once this initial habitual residence has been established, we recognize that
it is practically impossible for a newborn child, who is entirely dependent
on its parents, to acclimatize independent of the immediate home
environment of the parents.”79 
was not adapting well to his new environment, and often had headaches and crying fits.”  483
F.3d 617, 626 (9th Cir. 2007).  The court also said: “[W]e note that although the passage of time
itself is not dispositive on the issue of acclimatization, it is instructive that the children spent
nearly all of their lives in the United States, spoke little Greek, and had visited the country only
three or four times for two to three weeks at a time. With the irregular set-up of their household
in Greece, four months was an insufficient time for the children to ‘develop[ ] deep-rooted ties
to the family's new location.’”  Id. at 627 (alteration in original) (quoting Holder, 392 F.3d at
1021).
76. In Silvestri v. Oliva, the children arrived in the U.S. from Argentina on March 22, 2003;
the court found the father insisted that the children return to Argentina in early June 2003, and
the mother refused.  See 403 F. Supp. 2d at 384-86.  Ultimately, the court determined that the
habitual residence was the United States.  Id.  In Feder v. Evans-Feder, the child “moved, with
his mother and father, from Pennsylvania to Australia where he was to live for at the very least
the foreseeable future, and stayed in Australia for close to six months, a significant period of
time for a four-year old child.”  See 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995).
77. Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).  
78. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
79. Holder, 392 F.3d at 1020-21 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  Regarding the
impact of the age of a very young child on determining habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit
(which focuses initially on the intent of the parents) said:
While we recognize that a very young or developmentally disabled child may lack
cognizance of their surroundings sufficient to become acclimatized to a particular
country or to develop a sense of settled purpose, this case does not present us with
such a child. We therefore express no opinion on whether the habitual residence
of a child who lacks cognizance of his or her surroundings should be determined
by considering the subjective intentions of his or her parents.
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 992 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
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VI. Comparison of “Habitual Residence” and Jurisdictional Principles of
the UCCJEA
The rules governing child custody jurisdiction in the United States are
contained in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA), which has been adopted in all states except Massachusetts.80 
The rules of the UCCJEA are more precise than the rules of habitual
residence.  While “habitual residence,” as the term has been construed by
courts, relies on subjective concepts such as “intent,” “shared intent,” and
“acclimatization,” the UCCJEA uses the term “lives” and sets specific time
periods.  Under the UCCJEA, the power to make an initial custody
determination is given to the child=s “home state” if one exists.81  
“Home State” means the State in which a child lived with a
parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive
months immediately before the commencement of a child-
custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of
age, the term means the State in which the child lived from birth
with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary
absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.82
Once a state has made a child custody determination, that state “has
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination” until the child,
the child=s parent (or the person acting as parent) have all left the state, or
those persons no longer have a “significant connection” with the state.83 
80. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, UNIFORM
LAWS COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Child%20
Custody%20Jurisdiction%20and%20Enforcement%20Act (last visited Sept. 29, 2011);  see also
UCCJEA Adoptions, UNIFORM LAWS COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/docs/
UCCJEAadoptions.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).  The UCCJEA was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (now called the Uniform Law
Commission) in 1997.  See Nat=l Conference of Comm=rs of Unif. State Laws, Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act, U. PENNSYLVANIA L. SCH., http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/archives/ulc/uccjea/final1997act.pdf (last visited June 24, 2011). The jurisdictional
principles of the UCCJEA are similar to those of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act.  See 28 U.S.C. ' 1738A (2006).  Professor Robert Spector of the University of Oklahoma
College of Law served as Reporter for the Act.  Jeff Atkinson of DePaul University College of
Law (author of this paper) served as the ABA Advisor for the Act.     
81. See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act ' 201(a), 9 U.L.A. 133 (1999
& Supp. 2010).
82. Id. ' 102(7), 9 U.L.A. 102.
83. Id. ' 202(a), 9 U.L.A. 134.  The full text of section 202 is: 
Xx(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State which has
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There is some is some ambiguity regarding the UCCJEA=s terms of
“temporary absence” and “significant connection,” but the level of
ambiguity and uncertainty is much less than has arisen in construing
“habitual residence.”
The UCCJEA=s use of the term “lived” in the definition of “home state”
focusses on the child=s physical presence rather than intent of the parents.884 
As the Supreme Court of Texas observed: 
[T]he Legislature used the word “lived” “precisely to avoid
complicating the determination of a child=s home state with
inquiries into the states of mind of the child or the child=s adult
caretakers.” . . .  The UCCJEA was thus intended to give
prominence to objective factors. We believe that the UCCJEA
should be construed in such a way as to strengthen rather than
undermine the certainty that prioritizing home-state jurisdiction
was intended to promote, and thus decline to apply a test to
determine where a child “lived” based on the parties= subjective
intent.85
Habitual residence as applied through the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Children86 also places a different burden than the UCCJEA
made a child-custody determination consistent with Section 201 or 203 has
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
Xx(1) a court of this State determines that neither the child, nor the child and one
parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection
with this State and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this State
concerning the child=s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
Xx(2) a court of this State or a court of another State determines that the child, the
child=s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this
State.
Xx(b) A court of this State which has made a child-custody determination and
does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify
that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under
Section 201. 
Id. 
84. See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act ' 202(7), 9 U.L.A. 658.
85. Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Escobar v. Reisinger,
2003-NMCA-047, & 16, 133 N.M. 487, 64 P.3d 514.  In Powell, the court found that Tennessee
B and not Texas B was the child=s home state after the child moved from Texas and had lived
in Tennessee for eleven months. See id. at 328.  The court did not accept the mother=s argument
that the stay in Texas was only “temporary” and that she intended to return to Texas.  See id.
86. See Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children
supra note 5.
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regarding travel to the forum in actions to modify a custody determination. 
UCCJEA places the burden of travel to the forum on the party who has
changed the status quo by moving away from the forum that made the
initial (or prior) custody determination.  If a parent moved with the child
from the child=s former home state, that parent will need to return to the
state that issued the prior order to litigate future custody disputes (unless the
court that issued the earlier order finds that it is not a convenient forum).87 
The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, on the other hand,
directs that litigation concerning a child=s custody (or property) take place
in the state of the child=s habitual residence.88  Thus, in an action to modify
custody of a child, a parent who stayed in the state where an earlier custody
determination was made will have to travel to the child=s new state of
habitual residence to litigate custody or rights of access.89
Since the United States has ratified the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Children, U.S. courts will use habitual residence to determine
which country has jurisdiction over international custody disputes.  The
Uniform Law Commission has formed a drafting committee to amend the
UCCJEA to apply habitual residence to international disputes. The drafting
committee held its first meeting in September 2011. The drafting process
generally takes two to three years.  It is anticipated that the UCCJEA=s
existing rules regarding home state jurisdiction and exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction will continue to apply to custody disputes involving different
states within the United States.
VII. Conclusion
Globalization has many facets.  In addition to economic and business
integration, globalization encompasses international links within families
87. See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act ' 207, 9 U.L.A. 141 (1999)
(the “Inconvenient Forum” provision).  In order for the state that issued the prior order to have
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, the child, a parent, or a person acting as parent must continue
to reside in the state. See id. ' 202(a), 9 U.L.A. 134-35. (Supp. 2010). 
88. Article 5 of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Minors provides:  
(1) The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the
habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the
protection of the child=s person or property. 
 (2) Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child=s habitual residence to
another Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual
residence have jurisdiction. 
See Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation
in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, supra note
5, art. 5(2). 
89. See id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/3
2011] THE MEANING OF “HABITUAL RESIDENCE” 661
and the legal system that govern them. The Hague conventions pertaining to
protection of children and international child abduction provide uniform
rules for the countries that have adopted the conventions.   
Uniformity of law and cooperation between countries are of growing
importance as an increasing number of families have ties to more than one
country and have disputes that need orderly resolution. The determination
of “habitual residence” B a key concept in both conventions B helps resolve
the disputes. The legal issues, however, are not always easy to resolve or
predictable in outcome given the ambiguity in the term “habitual
residence.” In the United States, some ambiguities may be resolved if the
Supreme Court grants a Hague case to determine the order of consideration
and weight that should be given the child=s perspective and the parents=
intentions.
Both the child‘s perspective and the parents’ intention are important
factors.  The weight given those factors can vary from case to case, and the
importance of the child’s perspective will depend on the child’s age and
level of maturity.  The older and more mature a child is, the more weight
that should be given the child’s perspective when determining the child’s
habitual residence. Courts should avoid an artificially formalistic
determination such as applied in the Second Circuit in Gitter v. Gitter,
which gave strong presumptive weight to the parents’ “shared intent.”90 
The strength of a parent’s intent – and the degree to which intent is shared –
also can vary from case to case.  When determining habitual residence,
court should weigh multiple factors without being locked into a preset
formula of which factor should be considered first or which factor carries
the most weight. The use of multiple factors without pre-assigned weight
would be consistent with the conventions’ approach not to have a precise
definition of “habitual residence” and to avoid of automatic presumptions.91
By adopting the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, the
U.S. has given up some of the precision and predictability of its own law
for determining jurisdiction over international child custody disputes. 
Nonetheless, the benefits of a uniform international system and increased
cooperation between countries should outweigh the reduction of precision
and predictability.
90. 396 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2005).  For discussion of Gitter, see supra notes 37 - 47 and
accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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